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We consider the problem of risk diversification in complex networks. Nodes represent e.g. fi-
nancial actors, whereas weighted links represent e.g. financial obligations (credits/debts). Each
node has a risk to fail because of losses resulting from defaulting neighbors, which may lead to
large failure cascades. Classical risk diversification strategies usually neglect network effects and
therefore suggest that risk can be reduced if possible losses (i.e., exposures) are split among many
neighbors (exposure diversification, ED). But from a complex networks perspective diversification
implies higher connectivity of the system as a whole which can also lead to increasing failure risk
of a node. To cope with this, we propose a different strategy (damage diversification, DD), i.e. the
diversification of losses that are imposed on neighboring nodes as opposed to losses incurred by the
node itself. Here, we quantify the potential of DD to reduce systemic risk in comparison to ED. For
this, we develop a branching process approximation that we generalize to weighted networks with
(almost) arbitrary degree and weight distributions. This allows us to identify systemically relevant
nodes in a network even if their directed weights differ strongly. On the macro level, we provide an
analytical expression for the average cascade size, to quantify systemic risk. Furthermore, on the
meso level we calculate failure probabilities of nodes conditional on their system relevance.
PACS numbers: 89.75.-k, 89.65.-s, 02.50.-r
I. INTRODUCTION
In the course of globalization and technical advance-
ment, systems become more interconnected and system
components more dependent on the functioning of others
[13, 26]. In particular for socio-economic networks [25]
and financial networks [11, 14] we observe an increase in
coupling strength and complexity at the same time. Ex-
amples are global supply chains, but also technical sys-
tems, as, e.g., power-grids in the USA and Europe [6].
Increased dependence, under normal conditions, has
advantages for the efficient operation of systems. But
it also makes systems more vulnerable if some of their
components break down. Precisely, the failure of a few
components can get amplified such that it leads to system
wide failure cascades. Classical risk management theories
suggest that higher risk diversification reduces the failure
risk of the component and consequently the one of the
system as a whole. But these conclusions are based on
the assumption that a component only depends on other
components that are independent among each other.
This assumption does not hold in most real world sys-
tems. Therefore, we model such dependences by a net-
work where system components are represented as nodes
and direct interactions as links between nodes. Even if
the neighbors of a node are not linked directly, they can
be coupled indirectly through the network. This effect
increases if nodes have a high degree, i.e. are well diver-
sified in a financial context.
In order to study simple risk diversification strategies
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in the context of systemic risk a model introduced by
Watts [28] has been adopted to financial networks of in-
terbank lending [4, 10, 23]. We call this the exposure
diversification approach (ED), and in this paper we will
contrast it with an approach where the impact of a fail-
ing node is diversified, instead. In a banking network
this would correspond to a policy where each financial
institution is only allowed to get into a limited amount
of debt. This damage diversification approach (DD) has
the potential to reduce systemic risk significantly, since it
counterbalances the failure amplification caused by hubs.
Such hubs, because of their large number of neighbors,
considerably affect the network in case of failure. Conse-
quently, policy discussions center around the question of
how to prevent the failure of hubs, e.g. by increasing their
robustness (i.e. capital buffers in finance) [3, 23]. Our
findings from the DD approach suggest to complement
such regulatory efforts by the mitigation of the impact of
the failures of well connected nodes.
In this paper we present simulations as well as analytic
derivations of network ensemble averages in the limit of
infinite network size, where two quantities on the system
level are given: a) the degree distribution, which defines
the number of direct neighbors of a node and thus lim-
its their respective diversification strategies, and b) the
distribution of robustness which is later defined by the
failure threshold. The analytic method (also known as
heterogeneous mean field or branching process approxi-
mation) has been derived for the ED approach [12]. But,
it does not capture processes where the impact of a fail-
ing neighbor depends on its specific properties (e.g., its
degree or robustness) as it is required for the treatment
of the DD variant. Therefore, we extend the branching
process approximation to the latter case and generalize it
for the application to weighted random network models,
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2whose weight statistics could be deduced from data, tak-
ing also into account different properties of neighboring
nodes. This way, we generalize the analytic treatment to
match application scenarios, by better understanding the
role of different risk diversification strategies. Our anal-
ysis provides an interesting mesoscopic perspective with
the comparison of failure probabilities of nodes with dif-
ferent diversification strategies, which should accompany
the study of macroscopic measures, such as the average
cascade, since it is crucial for the identification of system-
relevant nodes.
II. MODELING EXPOSURE VERSUS DAMAGE
DIVERSIFICATION
In a weighted network with N nodes a link with (non-
zero) weight wji between two nodes j and i represents an
exposure of i to its network neighbor j. Each node j can
fail either initially or later in (discrete) time t because of
a propagating cascading process. Its (binary) state then
switches from si(t) = 0 (ok) to si(t) = 1 (failed), without
the possibility to recover.
If the node j fails, its neighbor i faces the loss wji. The
total amount of i’s losses sums up to its fragility
φi(t+ 1) =
∑
j
wjisj(t). (1)
If φi exceeds the threshold θi (i.e., φi ≥ θi), then node i
fails as well. Hence, θi expresses the robustness of node
i. In this way a cascade of failing nodes develops over
time, which can even span the whole network.
We measure the cascade size by the final fraction of
failed nodes
ρN = lim
t→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
si(t), (2)
when no further failures are triggered. Any cascade stops
after at most N time steps, since at least one node needs
to fail at a time to keep the process ongoing.
The cascade dynamics are fully deterministic for given
thresholds and weights on a fixed network. Still, many
systems do not remain constant over time, and may also
fluctuate by their exposure to large cascades. Conse-
quently, it is reasonable to quantify the risk of large cas-
cades with respect to macroscopic distributions that al-
low for microscopic variations of the weighted network
and the thresholds. The average cascade size with re-
spect to these distributions then defines our measure of
systemic risk.
In such a setting, we study the influence of two diversi-
fication variants. The difference between the ED and the
DD approach is in defining the weights wij . Precisely,
w
(ED)
ij =
1
kj
; w
(DD)
ij =
1
ki
(3)
for exposure diversifications (ED) and for damage diver-
sifications (DD) respectively. Here, ki denotes the degree
of node i, i.e., the number of its neighbors. We note that
in general w
(ED)
ij 6= w(ED)ji and w(DD)ij 6= w(DD)ji . Still, we
call the network undirected. This differs from the ap-
proach for directed networks [1, 2, 10] where the neigh-
bors whose failures impact a node are distinct from the
ones who face a loss in case of the node’s failure. In this
case one node is exposed to the other, but not vice versa.
In our case, however, once there is a link between two
nodes, each can impact the other, but the amount of the
loss can be different.
In the ED case every neighbor is treated identical. I.e.
a failure of any neighboring node j exposes a node i to
the same risk of a loss 1/ki. The higher the degree ki
of node i, the better it diversifies its total exposure of∑
j∈nb(i) 1/ki = 1, where nb(i) denotes the neighbors of
node i. I.e., in the ED case, single failures of neighbors j
become less harmful to node i if it has a larger number
of neighbors. On the other hand, the failure of a hub
impacts many other nodes and is thus problematic from
a system perspective.
In the DD case the impact of a hub is effectively re-
duced. I.e., the failure of a hub j has total impact∑
i∈nb(j) 1/kj = 1, which reduces the impact on a neigh-
boring node i to 1/kj instead of 1 in the ED case. Hence,
better diversified nodes damage each of their neighbors
effectively less in case of a failure.
We are interested in how the heterogeneity of such di-
versification strategies and the heterogeneity of thresh-
olds impacts systemic risk for large systems. In both
model variants the diversification strategies are deter-
mined by the degrees of the nodes.
Consequently, we study the fraction of failed nodes as
an average over a whole class of networks characterized
by a fixed degree distribution p(k) and a fixed thresh-
old distribution FΘ(θ) in the limit of infinitely large net-
works (N → ∞). The network generation method with
fixed p(k) is known as configuration model [18, 20], where
all possible network realizations (without multiple edges
and self-loops, but with a prescribed degree sequence) are
equally likely. The thresholds are then assigned to nodes
independently of each other, and independently of their
degree according to FΘ(θ), although the independence of
the degree is not a necessary assumption.
For the ED approach, the average fraction of failed
nodes at the end of a cascade can be calculated on ran-
dom networks with given degree distribution p(k) and
threshold distribution FΘ(θ) [12]. To obtain the results,
a branching process approximation was used, also known
as heterogeneous mean field approximation (HMF) or
as local tree approximation (LTA) [7]. This approxi-
mation was studied in many subsequent works. It was
generalized for directed and undirected weighted net-
works [1, 15], it was shown to be accurate even for
clustered networks with small mean inter-vertex dis-
tance [17], and the influence of degree-degree correlations
has been investigated [7, 22]. According to a general
3framework introduced by Lorenz et al. [16], the ED and
DD approach belong to the constant load class, where the
ED is called the inward variant, while the DD is identi-
fied as outward variant. Still, the risk reduction potential
of the latter has not been understood so far, since a sys-
tem’s exposure to systemic risk has been only explored
on fully-connected [16] or regular [27] networks, where
both model variants coincide.
In order to study the DD approach on more general
networks, we generalized and extended the existing ap-
proximations, which for the case of ED were proven to be
exact [1, 15]. Now, we can treat more general processes
where the directed weights in an undirected network can
depend on properties of both nodes, the failing as well
as the loss facing one. Here, in contrast to [1], nodes can
depend on each other, and in contrast to [15] they do so
in an non-symmetric way.
We show in Section IV that our approach leads to very
good agreements with simulations on finite Erdo¨s-Re´nyi
networks and can also be applied to a more realistic set-
ting where, e.g., the nodes’ degrees follow a scale free
distribution.
III. ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
A. Local tree approximation
In the configuration model a node i is characterized
only by its degree ki so that its failure probability P(F |ki)
depends solely on this information. Hence the (average)
final fraction of failed nodes is of the form
ρ∗ =
∑
k
p(k)P(F |k). (4)
The quantity ρ∗ allows for two different interpreta-
tions. On the system level, ρ∗ measures the final fraction
of failed nodes, and P(F |k) the fraction of failed nodes
with degree k. On the node level, ρ∗ can be seen as prob-
ability for a node to be failed, but if the node’s degree k
is known, then its actual failure probability is given by
P(F |k). In the following, we proceed with successively
decomposing P(F |k) into sums over products between
conditional probabilities that assume more information
about the network neighborhood, and probabilities that
the neighborhood is in the assumed state.
1. The conditional failure probability
The computation of P(F |k) relies on the assumption
of an infinite network size (N →∞), since the clustering
coefficient for the configuration model vanishes in the
limit, if the second moment of the degree distribution
is finite [19]. Consequently, the topology simplifies to
locally tree-like networks [7], where neighbors of a node
are not connected among each other, as illustrated in
FIG. 1. Illustration of the local tree approximation. The
green node is the focal node. Its failure probability P(F |k = 5)
can be computed according to Equation (5), and depends on
the state of its neighbors: Here, the two red ones and the gray
one have failed, while the two blue ones are still functional.
The neighbors’ conditional failure probabilities P(Fn|k) rely
on the failure probabilities of their own neighbors without
regarding the green focal point.
Fig. 1. The node under consideration with degree k is
colored in green and is also called the focal node. Its
failure probability P(F |k) decomposes into a sum over
two factors, due to the combination of a locally tree-
like network structure with the assumption that the local
neighborhood defines the state of a node already:
P(F |k) =
k∑
n=0
P(F |k, n)b(n, k, pi). (5)
The factor b(n, k, pi) describes the general state of the
neighborhood, namely the probability that among the k
neighbors of a node exactly n have failed. The factor
P(F |k, n) gives the probability that a node with degree
k fails after n of its neighbors have failed. Therefore,
it takes into account the ability of a node to withstand
shocks (i.e., failing neighbors).
If some of the neighbors of a node would be connected,
which violates the local tree-like assumption, we would
need to consider all possible (temporal) orders of their
failures. Instead, the configuration model allows for as-
signing every neighbor the same failure probability pi,
since no degree-degree correlations are present there, and
each neighbor’s failure is independent of the failure of the
others because of the locally tree-like network structure.
Consequently, the number of failed neighbors of a node is
binomially distributed so that n neighbors can fail with
4probability
b(n, k, pi) =
(
k
n
)
pin(1− pi)k−n.
However, the probability P(F |k, n) that such an event
causes the failure of the considered node with degree
k may depend on specific properties of the neighbors,
like e.g., their degrees ki and their failure probabilities
P(Fn|ki). By allowing this dependence, we introduce a
generalization of the existing heterogeneous mean field
approximation which enables the analytical treatment of
processes where failing nodes have different influences on
their neighbors according to their degree.
Also the conditional failure probability P(F |k, n) can
be decomposed into the sum over two factors
P(F |k, n) =
∑
kn∈In
p(kn|k, n)P(F |k,kn), (6)
where the sum runs over all possible configurations of
neighbors’ degrees denoted by I. kn is an abbrevia-
tion for a vector (k1, · · · , kn) of failed neighbors’ de-
grees and takes values in I. Generally, I = N or
I = [c] := {1, · · · , c} in the presence of a finite cutoff
c. Such a cutoff is inevitable in numerical computations
or in the observation of (finite) real world systems, while
it guarantees the finiteness of the second moment of p(k).
The probability p(kn|k, n) captures the precise state
of the neighborhood given that exactly n neighbors have
failed. More precisely, it is the probability that the n
failed neighbors of a node with degree k have degrees kn.
This factor may depend on the failing probabilities of
neighbors P(Fn|k1), · · · ,P(Fn|kn), while conditioned on
these failures, we denote P(F |k,kn) the probability that
a node with degree k fails. The latter is determined by
the specific cascading model, and will be discussed later
for our two diversification models.
2. The state of the neighborhood
In order to compute the failure probability
P(F |k) =
k∑
n=0
b(n, k, pi)
∑
kn∈In
p(kn|k, n)P(F |k,kn) (7)
we need to derive the state of the neighborhood as de-
scribed by the average failure probability of a neighbor
pi, and the failure probability p(kn|k, n) that the n failed
neighbors have degrees kn. Both depend on the degree
distribution of a neighbor pn(k) as well as its failure prob-
ability P(Fn|k).
It is important to note that a neighbor with degree k
(illustrated by the gray node in Fig. 1) does not fail with
probability P(F |k), since one of its links leads to the fo-
cal node (illustrated by the green node in Fig. 1). Condi-
tional on the event that the focal node has not failed yet,
only the remaining k − 1 neighbors of the gray neighbor
(colored with bold fringe) could have caused the failure
of the gray neighbor of the focal node. This model prop-
erty is called the Without Regarding Property (WOR) by
Hurd and Gleeson [15]. Therefore, a neighbor’s failure
probability P(Fn|k) is
P(Fn|k) =
k−1∑
n=0
b(n, k − 1, pi)
∑
kn∈In
p(kn|k, n)P(F |k,kn).
(8)
It remains to calculate p(kn|k, n) and the uncondi-
tional failure probability of a neighbor pi. Both depend
on the degree distribution pn(k) of a neighbor. Because
of the local tree approximation, it is independent of the
degree distribution of the other nodes in the network:
pn(k) :=
kp(k)
z
, (9)
where z :=
∑
k kp(k) denotes the normalizing average
degree. pn(k) is proportional to the degree k in the con-
figuration model, because each of a neighbor’s k links
could possibly connect the neighbor with the focal node
(see, e.g., [19]).
We, therefore, obtain the unconditional failure proba-
bility pi of a neighbor by
pi =
∑
k
pn(k)P(Fn|k) =
∑
k
kp(k)
z
P(Fn|k). (10)
Similarly, the degree distribution of a neighbor condi-
tional on its failure can be written as P(Fn|k)p(k)k/zpi
so that we can calculate the probability p(kn|k, n) that
the n failed neighbors have degrees kn by
p(kn|k, n) =
n∏
j=1
p(kj)kjP(Fn|kj)
zpi
, (11)
since the neighbors are independent of each other, ac-
cording to the locally tree-like network structure.
3. Fixed point iteration for the conditional failure
probability
In short, the vector P(Fn|k) = (P(Fn|k))k∈{1,··· ,c}
turns out to be a fixed point of a vector valued function
L (p) so that for the k−th component we have:
P(Fn|k) =
k−1∑
n=0
b(n, k − 1, pi)
∑
kn∈In
P(F |k,kn)·
·
n∏
j=1
p(kj)kjP(Fn|kj)
zpi
= Lk (P(Fn|k)) .
Such a fixed point exists according to the Knaster-Tarski
Theorem, since L (p) is monotone with respect to a par-
tial ordering and maps the complete lattice [0, 1]
I
onto
itself. [21]
5Thus, starting from an initial vector P(Fn|k)(0) which
is defined by the considered cascading model, we can
compute the fixed point iteratively by
P(Fn|k)(t+1) = L
(
P(Fn|k)(t)
)
, (12)
with
pi(t) =
∑
k
pn(k)P(Fn|k)(t). (13)
Each iteration step (t) corresponds to one discrete time
step of the cascading process so that
ρ(t) =
∑
k
p(k)P(F |k)(t) (14)
can be interpreted as average fraction of failed nodes in
the network at time t. Note that the relation between
P(F|k)(t) and P(Fn|k)(t) is described by Equation (7)
and Equation (11).
4. Simplification for homogeneous failure probability
In case the impact of a failing neighbor does not de-
pend on its degree, the failure probability P(F |k,kn) =
P(F |k, n) does not depend on the degrees kn of its n
failed neighbors and Equation (12) can be simplified to
P(Fn|k) =
k−1∑
n=0
b(n, k − 1, pi)P(F |k, n)
n∏
j=1
1
pi
∑
kj∈I
p(kj)kjP(Fn|kj)
z
=
k−1∑
n=0
b(n, k − 1, pi)P(F |k, n),
(15)
using Equation (10). Inserting this into Equation (10)
leads to the fixed point equation
pi =
∑
k
kp(k)
z
k−1∑
n=0
b(n, k − 1, pi)P(F |k, n) (16)
which in this case involves the scalar pi instead of the
vector P(Fn|k) in Equation (12). With this information
the final fraction of failed nodes can be computed as
ρ∗ =
∑
k
p(k)
k∑
n=0
b(n, k, pi)P(F |k, n), (17)
as already known from the literature [7, 12]. Still, this
simpler approach is not able to capture the cascade dy-
namics of the damage diversification model.
5. The ability of a node to withstand a shock
The only piece missing in our derivations is the model
specific probability P(F |k,kn) that a node with degree k
fails exactly after n of its neighbors with degrees kn have
failed. This probability captures the failure dynamics,
and is thus defined by a node’s fragility φ(k,kn) and its
threshold Θ(k). The given information about the degrees
k,kn can in principle enter both variables, although the
cumulative threshold distribution FΘ(k) tends to depend
solely on properties of the node itself, e.g. the degree k.
Because a node fails, if its fragility exceeds its threshold,
we have
P(F |k,kn) = P (Θ(k) ≤ φ(k,kn)) . (18)
More generally, with respect to known weight distribu-
tions pW (kj ,k) for given degree kj of a neighbor and the
degree k of a node, Equation (18) reads:
P(F |k,kn) = P
Θ(k) ≤ n∑
j=1
W (kj , k)

=
∫
FΘ(k)(w)
(
pW (k1,k) ∗ · · · ∗ pW (kn,k)
)
(w) dw .
(19)
The last equation holds if the weight distributions
pW (kj ,k) are independent, and the ∗ denotes a convolu-
tion.
In the simpler case of our two model variants, the
weights W (kj , k) are completely deterministic. In accor-
dance with the definition of the weights in Equation (3)
we calculate for the ED case
P(F |k,kn)(ED) = P(F |k, n)(ED) = FΘ(k)
(n
k
)
(20)
which is independent of the neighbors’ degrees. Con-
sequently, the calculation of the average final fraction
of failed nodes can be simplified as outlined in Sec-
tion III A 4.
For the DD case the fixed point iteration needs to take
into account all degrees of the failed neighbors, since they
define the loss 1/kj the focal node faces. Thus, we have
P(F |k,kn)(DD) = FΘ(k)
 n∑
j=1
1
kj
 . (21)
6. DD case: Correct Heterogeneous Mean Field
Approximation (cHMF)
The probability of the failure of a node or neighbor
with degree k and n failed neighbors P(F |k, n)(DD) given
by Equation (6) needs to be re-calculated for each fixed
point iteration step. For the DD case, this involves the
calculation of the convolution of the impact distribution
pimp of a failed neighbor, which depends on the iteratively
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FIG. 2. (a) The studied degree distributions: Poisson distri-
bution with parameter λ = 8 and cutoff degree c = 50 (blue),
scale free distribution with exponent γ = 3 and maximal de-
gree c = 200 (red) in log-log scale. (b) Comparison of the final
fraction of failed nodes obtained by simulations (symbols) on
networks with 1000 nodes as average over 2000 independent
realizations with numerical results from the cHMF (lines) for
the DD case on Poisson random graphs. The thresholds Θ
are normally distributed with mean µ and standard deviation
σ (Θ ∼ N (µ, σ)).
updated failure probability P(Fn|k). More precisely, one
failed neighbor inflicts the loss 1/k with probability
pimp
(
1
k
)
= P(Fn|k)kp(k)
zpi
(22)
(that is conditioned on its failure) independently of the
other failed neighbors. Thus, the fragility φ(k, n) of a
node with degree k and n failed neighbors is distributed
according to the n-th convolution of this impact distri-
bution p∗nimp and we have
P(F |k, n) = P (Θ(k) ≤ φ(k, n)) =
∑
l
p∗nimp(l)FΘ(l),
where the inner sum runs over all possible values of the
fragility.
Since the convolutions are computationally demanding
(in terms of time and especially memory), we approxi-
mate p∗nimp by first binning it to an equidistant grid and
then using Fast Fourier Transformations (FFT) in or-
der to take advantage of the fact that convolutions cor-
respond to simple multiplications in Fourier space (see
for instance [9, 24]). Although this is numerically accu-
rate enough for the calculation of the final fraction of
failed nodes, for the reporting of the vectors P(F|k) and
P(Fn|k) we use a more precise direct convolution of the
binned impact distributions pimp, as is described in the
Appendix. Fig. 2 shows that our numerical results coin-
cide with simulations.
7. Neglecting the neighbors’ degrees in the failure
probability (simpHMF)
Considering the computational complexity of the
cHMF approach we described above, it is worth asking
whether we can approximate it with a simpler version as,
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FIG. 3. (a) Fraction of failed nodes obtained by (simpHMF)
for the DD case on Poisson random networks with λ = 8
and c = 50. (b) Difference between the correct version
(cHMF) and a). (c) Fraction of failed nodes obtained by
(simpHMF) for the DD case on scale free networks with γ = 3
and c = 200. (d) Difference between the corresponding cor-
rect version (cHMF) version and c). The thresholds Θ are
normally distributed with mean µ and standard deviation σ
(Θ ∼ N (µ, σ)).
e.g., the one described in Section III A 4, and still obtain
reasonably good results.
This would require the probability P(F |k,kn) to be
independent of the neighbors’ degree. Consequently, we
would assume that every failed neighbor transfers a load
1/k with probability
psimp
(
1
k
)
=
kp(k)
z
, (23)
although its degree does not need to coincide with k.
Therefore, by computing
P(F |k,kn) =
∑
l
p∗nsimp(l)FΘ(l) = P(F |k, n) (24)
we can calculate the failure probability initially without
the need to update it in each fixed point iteration. Al-
though this approach is more convenient, as shown in
Fig. 3, it is inadequate for the damage diversification
variant, especially in combination with skew degree dis-
tributions (as, e.g., in case of scale free networks). This
is because if we follow this simplified calculation, we lose
the risk reducing effect by hubs that are connected to
more nodes, and we would draw opposite conclusions
about systemic risk. So, as shown in Fig. 3, it is cru-
cial to use the correct HMF to explain our simulation
results.
7IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We calculate the final fraction of failed nodes for Pois-
son random graphs and scale free networks with degree
distributions
pP (k) :=
1
SP
λk
k!
, pS(k) :=
1
SS
1
kγ
(25)
for k ∈ {1, · · · , c} with normalizing constants
SP :=
c∑
k=1
λk
k!
and SS :=
c∑
k=1
1
kγ
, (26)
as shown in Fig. 2(a).
The Poisson random graphs are of interest as limit of
the well studied Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs [8], and in
comparison to the simulations serve as benchmark for
our method (see Fig. 2(b)), while the class of scale free
networks is more realistic with respect to real world net-
works [5].
Similar to [28] and [12] we study normally distributed
thresholds Θ ∼ N (µ, σ2) with mean µ and standard de-
viation σ, but, we explore the role of the thresholds’ het-
erogeneity as well as their mean size more extensively.
Although our analytic framework also applies to more
general cases, here we assume the thresholds to be inde-
pendent from the degree k of a node.
A. System Failures
Complementary to [28] we find that increasing the
standard deviation can also reduce the cascade size -
even though more nodes fail initially, similarly to what
was reported for fully connected networks in [16], where
the ED and DD cases coincide. The initial fraction of
failed nodes is determined by the nodes with negative
thresholds (Θ ≤ 0) and is thus given by FΘ(0) = Φ(−µσ ),
where Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function of
the standard normal distribution, as illustrated in the
center of Fig. 4.
More pronounced is the sudden regime shift from a
region of negligible systemic risk to an almost complete
break-down of the system that occurs for Poisson random
graphs for moderate robustness (µ < 0.4) and increasing
threshold heterogeneity (measured by σ) as shown in the
first row of Fig. 4. The same phenomenon can be found
in fully-connected or regular random networks [16], but
for a more realistic degree distribution, like the scale free
distribution with exponent γ = 3, the regime shift is
smoothed out as shown in the third row of Fig. 4.
The low average degree of scale free networks, in our
case z = 1.3643, seems to make the systems less vulner-
able. Also our computations for Poisson random graphs
with the same average degree (and thus a parameter
λ = 0.6571, i.e. below the percolation threshold) lead to
similar results as for the case of scale free networks. But,
the system size N needs to be considered as well before
concluding anything with respect to system safety. Our
simulations on scale free networks consisting of N = 1000
nodes show similar sudden regime shifts as those for
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs. But, still, the degree dis-
tributions of the simulated networks also tend to have
higher average degrees than the one used here.
We can verify the simulation results with the help of
the cHMF by taking a representative degree distribution
of simulated networks as input. But, the degree distri-
bution of a simulated network would only converge to
the theoretical one used in Equation (25) in the limit of
infinite network size. In reality though, it might approx-
imate it well for N = 107.
Still, we can conclude that in very large systems (N >
107) where few big hubs coexist with a majority of small
degree nodes, the lower connectivity can significantly re-
duce systemic risk, especially in case of the DD.
As shown in Fig. 4 the DD variant exposes the system
to a lower risk than the ED, with a minor exception at
the phase transition line for the case of Poisson random
graphs.
Still, for both our model variants, a higher risk di-
versification for every node does not lead to better out-
comes in general. In fully connected networks - where
every node is connected with everyone else and maximal
risk diversification is realized - the system is exposed to
a higher risk of large cascades in comparison with the
studied scale free networks. The same holds for Poisson
random graphs except for threshold parameters close to
the phase transition, where the change is so abrupt that
we cannot draw any conclusions.
In fact, well diversified - and thus also well connected -
nodes have a higher failure risk in regions of high systemic
risk in both model variants.
B. Individual failure probabilities
In ED a high diversification is expected to decrease the
individual failure risk, since the failure of a high number
of neighbors is less probable than the failure of fewer
neighbors. As shown in Fig. 5(a) and (b), this intuition
applies only to regions of lower systemic risk, but tends
to saturate for increasing degree k as does the fragility
φ ' 1/k. What is not considered in this reasoning is
the impact that a failure of a well diversified node has
on the overall system stability. Once there is the chance
that a few hubs fail, they trigger larger failure cascades
in which the failure probability of a neighbor pi increases.
Once pi is big enough, hubs face an even higher failure
probability P(F |k) than nodes with smaller degrees as
shown in Fig. 5(a). But, also this effect saturates for
increasing degrees.
Mathematically, we see that the shape of the individual
failure probabilities P(F |k) for ED are defined by only
two system sizes: pi, which indicates the overall system
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FIG. 4. Phase diagrams for the final fraction of failed nodes ρ for different degree distributions, diversification variants, and
their differences. The thresholds Θ are normally distributed with mean µ and standard deviation σ (Θ ∼ N (µ, σ)). The darker
the color the higher is the systemic risk. First row: Poisson distribution with parameter λ = 8 and cutoff degree c = 50 for the
ED (left) and DD (right). The middle shows their difference ρ(ED) − ρ(DD). Third row: Scale free distribution with exponent
γ = 3 and maximal degree c = 200 for the ED (left) and DD (right). The middle shows their difference ρ(ED) − ρ(DD). Second
row: The difference between the diagrams with Poisson and Scale free degree distributions for the ED variant (left). Similarly
for the DD variant (right). In the middle the initial fraction of failed nodes ρ(0) is illustrated. ρo := ρ(0) is constant along the
lines σ = µ/Φ−1(ρ0).
state, and the threshold distribution:
P(F |k) =
k∑
n=0
b(n, k, pi)FΘ
(n
k
)
.
P(F |k) does not depend directly on the degree distribu-
tion, and thus the diversification strategies of the other
nodes. Still, if pi exceeds a certain threshold (which is
close to µ), nodes with higher degree have a higher fail-
ure probability.
In contrast, hubs in DD have always a higher failure
probability. Each additional neighbor introduces the pos-
sibility of a loss, if it fails. Thus the shape of the condi-
tional failure probability
P(F |k) =
k∑
n=0
b(n, k, pi)
∑
l
p∗nimp(l)FΘ(l)
will always look similar as the ones presented in Fig. 5(c).
Consequently, too many nodes with high degrees would
increase the vulnerability of the system. Still, the pres-
ence of hubs also decreases the overall failure risk by de-
creasing some of the possible losses. These losses are
distributed by p∗nimp(l) and can thus reduce all P(F |k).
Especially less diversified nodes (which have a chance
to survive also large failure cascades) profit from the di-
versification of others.
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FIG. 5. (a) Conditional failure probability for ED and normally distributed thresholds with parameters (µ, σ) = (0.5, 0.25)
with respect to a neighbor’s failure probability of pi = 0.4 (blue), pi = 0.5 (black) and pi = 0.6 (red). (b) Conditional failure
probability for ED and normally distributed thresholds with parameters (µ, σ) = (0.3, 0.5) (black), (µ, σ) = (0.5, 0.6) (red),
(µ, σ) = (0.5, 0.25) (blue) and pi defined by cascade equilibrium. Lines indicate a scale free distribution with γ = 3 and c = 200
and thus z = 1.3643, while symbols belong to Poisson random graphs with λ = 0.657 and c = 100 (with the same z). (c) As in
(b), but for DD.
V. DISCUSSION
Although risk diversification is generally considered to
lower the risk of an individual node, on the system level
it can even lead to the amplification of failures. With our
work, we have deepened the understanding of cascading
failure processes in several ways.
At first, we generalize the method to calculate the sys-
temic risk measure, i.e. the average cascade size, to in-
clude directed and weighted interactions. This macro
measure is complemented by a measure on the meso level,
by calculating individual failure probabilities of nodes
based on their degree (diversification).
This allows us to compare two different diversifica-
tion mechanisms: ED (exposure diversification) and DD
(damage diversification). As we demonstrate, nodes
which diversify their exposures well (i.e. hubs), have a
lower failure risk only as long as the system as a whole is
relatively robust. But above a certain threshold for the
failure probability of neighboring nodes, such hubs are at
higher risk than other nodes because they are more ex-
posed to cascading failures. This effect tends to saturate
for large degrees.
In general, most regulatory efforts follow the too big to
fail strategy, and focus on the prevention of the failures
of systemic relevant nodes - the hubs. This is mainly
achieved by an increase of the thresholds, i.e., capital
buffers in a financial context, but, in reality it could be
very costly.
With our study of another diversification strategy, the
damage diversification, we suggest to accompany regula-
tory efforts by mitigating the failure of hubs. By limiting
the loss that every node can impose on others, the dam-
age potential of hubs and, thus, the overall systemic risk
is significantly reduced. While this is systemically prefer-
able, the DD strategy is a two-edged sword: Hubs face an
increased failure risk, but many small degree nodes bene-
fit from the diversification of their neighbors. This lowers
the incentives for diversification as long as no other bene-
fit, e.g., higher gains in times of normal system operation,
comes along with a high degree.
As we show, the systemic relevance of a node is not
solely defined by its degree, or connectivity. The size of
its impact in case of its failure and thus its ability to
cause further failures is crucial. It is a strength of our
approach that we can include this impact analytically
and obtain a more refined and realistic identification of
system relevant nodes.
If necessary, it is still straight forward to adopt our ana-
lytical expansions to the case of directed networks, where
the failure of one node would impact another node, but
not vice versa. Additionally, our approach can be trans-
fered to degree-degree correlated networks. We would
expect that a high degree assortativity in the DD could
further reduce systemic risk, since many less diversified
nodes could be saved by connections to hubs whose fail-
ures would impact their neighborhood only little, but
this is outside the scope of the current paper, and will be
addressed in a future work.
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VI. APPENDIX
A. Approximation of the convolution
For the DD it is necessary but computational expensive
to calculate the convolution p∗
n
imp, where
pimp
(
1
k
)
= P(Fn|k)kp(k)
zpi
10
denotes the probability of a loss φ = 1/k caused by the
failure of one neighbor with degree k. Given that n neigh-
bors have failed, a node faces a loss φn, which is a random
variable following the law p∗
n
imp.
But the number, l, of φn’s values with nonzero proba-
bility mass, which are of relevant size for good accuracy,
as well as the number of accumulation points grows ex-
ponentially with the order n.
In the end we are interested in calculating the failure
probability
∑
l p
∗n
imp(l)FΘ(l) of a node so that it suffices to
compute p∗
n
imp accurately on an interval [0, b] ⊂ R, where
the threshold distribution FΘ is effectively smaller than
1. Otherwise we consider the summand∑
l>b
p∗nimp(l)FΘ(l) ' 1−
∑
l≤b
p∗nimp(l).
We vary the parameters µ and σ of the threshold dis-
tribution between 0 and 1 so that we can savely set
b = 5. Next, we partition [0, b] into J small intervals
Ij = ](j − 1)h, jh] of length h, with j = 1, · · · , J . For
small enough h (here h = 10−5) it is numerically pre-
cise enough to assume the approximation of p∗
n
imp to be
constant on J .
a. Convolution with the help of FFT In the stan-
dard (and faster) algorithm that we use, we simply bin
pimp to [0, b] by
pˆimp(jh) :=
{∑
k:(j−1)h< 1k≤jh p(k) j = 1, · · · , J,
0 otherwise.
Then, we apply the Fast Fourier Transformation
(FFT) [9, 24], and take the n-th power of the distribution
and transform it back in order to receive pˆ∗
n
imp.
This is numerically accurate enough for the calculation
of the final fraction of failed nodes ρ∗, but often does not
serve well, if we want to deduce the shape of P(F |k).
For that purpose we have implemented a more precise
alternative.
b. Alternative convolution algorithm Here we do not
assume pˆ∗
n
imp to be constant on an interval Ij , but uni-
formly distributed instead. For any (discrete) probability
distribution pX we define its approximation in x ∈ [0, b]
as
a (pimp(x)) :=
J∑
j=1
x− (j − 1)h
h
1{(j−1)h<x≤jh}∑
y:(j−1)h<y≤jh
pX(y).
Thus, we get for pimp
a (pimp(x)) :=
J∑
j=1
x− (j − 1)h
h
1{(j−1)h<x≤jh}
∑
k:(j−1)h< 1k≤jh
P(Fn|k)p(k)k
zpi
.
This is the initial distribution of an iteration in which
we compute p̂∗nimp in the n-th step by convoluting it first
exactly with p̂∗n−1imp of the previous step with the non-
approximated pimp. Afterwards we bin it to the intervals
Ij again
p̂∗nimp := a
(
p̂∗n−1imp ∗ pimp
)
,
with
p̂∗1imp := a (pimp) .
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